【双语阅读】Fatalism v fetishism宿命论VS进口至上说.

　　Economics focus

　　Fatalism v fetishism

　　Jun 11th 2009

　　From The Economist print edition

　　How will developing countries grow after the financial crisis?

　　FORTY years ago Singapore, now home to the world’s busiest port, was a forlorn outpost still garrisoned by the British. In 1961 South Korea was less industrialised than the communist north and dependent on American aid. In 1978 China’s exports amounted to less than 5% of its GDP. These countries, and many of their neighbours, have since traded their way out of poverty. Given their success, it is easy to forget that some development economists were once prey to “export fatalism”. Poor countries, they believed, had little to gain from venturing into the world market. If they tried to expand their exports, they would thwart each other, driving down the price of their commodities.

　　The financial crisis of the past nine months is stirring a new export fatalism in the minds of some economists. Even after the global economy recovers, developing countries may find it harder to pursue a policy of “export-led growth”, which served countries like South Korea so well. Under this strategy, sometimes called “export fetishism”, countries spur sales abroad, often by keeping their currencies cheap. Some save the proceeds in foreign-currency reserves, rather than spending them on imports. This strategy is one reason why the developing world’s current-account surplus exceeded $700 billion in 2008, as measured by the IMF. In the past, these surpluses were offset by American dicits. But America may now rethink the bargain. This imbalance, whereby foreigners sell their goods to America in exchange for its assets, was one potential cause of the country’s financial crisis.

　　If this global bargain does come unstuck, how should developing countries respond? In a new paper*, Dani Rodrik of Harvard University offers a novel suggestion. He argues that developing countries should continue to promote exportables, but no longer promote exports. What’s the difference? An exportable is a good that could be traded across borders, but need not be. Mr Rodrik’s recommended policies would help countries make more of these exportables, without selling quite so many abroad.

　　Countries grow by shifting labour and investment from traditional activities, where productivity is stagnant, to new industries, which abound in economies of scale or opportunities to assimilate better techniques. These new industries usually make exportable goods, such as cotton textiles or toys. But whatever the fetishists believe, there is nothing special about the act of exporting per se, Mr Rodrik argues. For example, companies do not need to venture abroad to feel the bracing sting of international competition. If their products can be traded across borders, then foreign rivals can compete with them at home.

　　As countries industrialise and diversify, their exports grow, which sometimes results in a trade surplus. These three things tend to go together. But in a statistical “horse race” between the three—industrialisation, exports and exports minus imports—Mr Rodrik finds that it is the growth of tradable, industrial goods, as a share of GDP, that does most of the work.

　　How do you promote exportables without promoting exports? Cheap currencies will not do the trick. They serve as a subsidy to exports, but also act like a tax on imports. They encourage the production of tradable goods, but discourage their consumption—which is why producers look for buyers abroad.

　　Policymakers need a different set of tools, Mr Rodrik argues. They should set aside their exchange-rate policies in favour of industrial policy, subsidising promising new industries directly. These sops would expand the production of tradable goods above what the market would dictate. But the subsidy would not discourage their consumption. Indeed, policymakers should allow the country’s exchange rate to strengthen naturally, eliminating any trade surplus. The stronger currency would cost favoured industries some foreign customers. But these firms would still do better overall than under a policy of laissez-faire.

　　Return of the cargo cult

　　Mr Rodrik offers a solution to an awkward problem: how policymakers can restore the growth strategies of the pre-crisis era without reviving the trade imbalances that accompanied them. But is his solution as neat as it sounds? Start with the theory. Mr Rodrik claims there is nothing special about exporting. He is probably right. But his statistical test is unlikely to be the last word on the matter, given the difficulties of disentangling variables that move together. Mr Rodrik’s model also assumes a single tradable good. Under his policies, countries sell the same kind of stuff at home that they formerly sold to foreigners. In a more elaborate model, foreign and local tastes would differ. China, for example, made most of the world’s third-generation mobile phones long bore 3G telephony was available at home. Firms in poor countries can learn a lot from serving richer customers abroad.

　　What about the practice? Subsidies are notoriously prone to error and abuse. Even bore the crisis, Mr Rodrik was keen to rehabilitate industrial policy in the eyes of many economists, who doubt governments’ ability to pick winners but have every faith in their aptitude for favouring corporate friends. In these circles, a cheap currency is often seen as the least disreputable form of industrial policy, because it benits exporters in general, without favouring any particular industry or firm.

　　This ingenious economist may also be preparing for a future that is further off than you might think. American policymakers are certainly worried about their country’s trade dicit. But they are far more concerned about unemployment. Most of their forts to revive demand will tend to widen the trade gap, at least in the short run. The American government is also more anxious than ever to sell its paper, and whatever they say in public, the central banks of China and other big emerging economies still seem happy to buy. Export fetishism seems fated to endure.

　　【中文翻译对照】

　　经济聚焦

　　宿命论 VS 进口至上说

　　2009年6月11日

　　摘自《经济学人》杂志

　　金融危机后发展中国家将如何成长?

　　现今世界最繁忙的港口坐落于新加坡——在40年前它还只是英国人驻军的遥远哨所。1961年的南朝鲜靠美国援助度日，在产业化的路上远远落后于他们北面的社会主义邻居。1987年的中国出口额占GDP总量不到5%。之后，这些国家和他们的邻居们靠开放商路脱离了贫穷。在这些国家成功的光环下，过去许多发展经济学家深受“出口宿命说”(注一)折磨的往事被淡忘了。他们曾经相信，穷国投身全球市场并无利可图。一旦他们试图扩大出口，那么穷国之间便会互相伤害并造成他们出产的商品价格下降。

　　过去九个月里的金融危机在某些经济学家的脑海里搅起了新的出口宿命论。就算是在金融危机过后，也许发展中国家也可能会觉得他们要想采用那种使南朝鲜一类的国家受益颇多的“出口带动型增长”政策变得更加困难了。在这种被称为“出口至上主义”的策略下，政府常以保持本国货币的廉价来激励跨国贸易。一些国家选择把出口收益存入外汇储备，而不是用它们来进口。国际货币基金组织统计出，2008年发展中国家的经常账户(注二)有7千亿美元的结余，这(出口至上主义的策略)也许就是原因之一。在过去，这些结余会被美国的贸易逆差抵消。但是美国现在可能要重新考虑一下这笔交易了。外国人通过此类失衡来出售货物给美国人以换取美国资产，这也是美国金融危机的潜在原因之一。

　　若这种全球交易确实还可行，发展中国家该如何应对?哈弗大学的Dani Rodrik(注三)在他的新论文中提供了一个新颖的建议。他认为发展中国家应该继续鼓励“可出口”，但不要促进“出口”。这两者的差异是什么呢?“可出口”指那些可以但不必出口的货物。Mr Rodrik所推荐的政策会帮助发展中国家生产更多的“可出口”货物同时避免将它们大量售往国外。

　　在后金融危机时代，决策者该如何在保留利于增长的策略同时又避免随之而来的贸易失衡呢?Mr Rodrik提供了他对这个令人尴尬的问题的解决办法。但是他的办法和听上去的一样有效吗? Mr Rodrik以"贸易没什么大不了的"作为他理论的开始。这可能没错。但当遇到无法理清同时变化的诸多变量这类困难时，他的统计实验不可能给这个问题盖棺论定。同时，Mr Rodrik的模型只假设了单一“可出口”货物。在他的政策下，所有国家都在本国出售同一种他们之前卖到国外的商品。在更精确的模型下，国外与国内的偏好应该不同。举例来说，远在3G电话可以使用前，中国国内就已经制造了世界上最多的第三代移动电话。穷国的企业可以在取悦富国的消费者的过程中学到许多。

　　当生产力停滞后，国家通过从传统经济活动中转移劳力和投资到新兴产业里来成长，这些新产业大量存在于规模经济或是那些吸纳了更先进技术的商机中。这类新产业往往制造的是“可出口”货物，像是棉织物或玩具。但是Mr Rodrik也谈到，无论贸易至上主义者怎么想，出口本身并无异处。举例来说，公司并不一定要冒险开展国外业务来受国际竞争的刺激。一旦他们的货品被出口，那么国外竞争者便将可以在本国土地上展开反击。

　　伴随着国家产业化和产品多样化进程的是出口增加，这有时会带来贸易过剩。这三种状况相伴相生。但在产业化，出口和净出口的数据化对比中，Mr Rodrik 发现，作为GDP的一部分，是“可交易”的产业产品起了主要作用。

　　那如何来刺激“可出口”同时避免促进出口呢?廉价货币办不到。它们削减出口，但同时又像增收进口关税。他们促进“可出口”货物的生产同时又抑止它们被消费，这就是为什么生产者会寻求外国买家的原因。

　　Mr Rodrik认为决策者需要另一套不同的工具。他们应该以产业政策取代汇率政策并直接向有澳际的新产业补助。这些操作可以在市场确定数额的基础上拓展“可交易”货物的生产。但是这些补助金又不会影响“可出口”货物的销售。事实上，决策者应该允许他们国家的汇率自由上浮，以消除贸易过量。更强的货币将会抑止外国资金流入过热部门。但就算这样，这些企业也会比在自由放任政策下来得更好。

　　货物崇拜归来

　　那实践方面又如何呢?补助金有着臭名昭著的倾向，那就是易于发放出错和被滥用。甚至在金融危机前，Mr Rodrik在许多经济学家的眼里就是一个执着于整顿产业政策的人，这些经济学家怀疑政府是否能在挑选受助者的同时不滥用这种可以惠及盟友的能力。在这些圈子中，由于廉价货币一般来说会有利于出口者而对特定产业和企业没有好处，这种政策是最为声名狼藉。

　　这位天才的经济学家可能是在为一个你无法想象的未来做着准备。美国的决策者确实很担心他们国家的贸易逆差。但失业率更让他们操心。至少在短期，他们的大部分拉动需求的努力都将会扩大贸易壁垒。同时美国政府正前所未有地热切盼望能够售出他们所谓“中国央行和其他新兴经济体依然十分情愿购买”的债券。似乎出口至上主义者命中注定得等等了。

　　注一：关于进口宿命说，可参看Speech by Hon&aposble Thiru Murasoli Maran, Union Commerce&IndustryMinister

　　注二：　经常账户(Current Account，或译为“经常项目”)，是经常发生的国际经济交易，是最基本、最重要的账户。包括货物、服务、收入和经常转移四个项目。

　　经常账户(即“经常项目”)，和资本与金融账户相对，指在国际收支平衡表中贸易和服务而产生的资金流动。这一部分所以被看成是一种更加合理的资金流动。

　　国际收支中的经常账户是指贸易收支的总和(商品和服务的出口减去进口)，减去生产要素收入(例如利息和股息)，然后减去转移支付(例如外国援助)。经常项目顺差(盈余)增加了一个国家相应金额的外国资本净额;经常项目逆差(赤字)则恰好相反。

　　贸易收支是经常账户下典型的最重要的部分。也就是说贸易状况的变化是经常账户的主要影响因素。然而，对于那些少数的拥有大量海外资产和负债的国家，生产要素支付净额可能作用显著。

　　经常账户，资本账户，金融账户以及官方储备的变化一起，总和为零构成账户的定义。这个总和被称为国际收支。通常来说，官方储备的变化非常小。

　　Economics focus

　　Fatalism v fetishism

　　Jun 11th 2009

　　From The Economist print edition

　　How will developing countries grow after the financial crisis?

　　FORTY years ago Singapore, now home to the world’s busiest port, was a forlorn outpost still garrisoned by the British. In 1961 South Korea was less industrialised than the communist north and dependent on American aid. In 1978 China’s exports amounted to less than 5% of its GDP. These countries, and many of their neighbours, have since traded their way out of poverty. Given their success, it is easy to forget that some development economists were once prey to “export fatalism”. Poor countries, they believed, had little to gain from venturing into the world market. If they tried to expand their exports, they would thwart each other, driving down the price of their commodities.

　　The financial crisis of the past nine months is stirring a new export fatalism in the minds of some economists. Even after the global economy recovers, developing countries may find it harder to pursue a policy of “export-led growth”, which served countries like South Korea so well. Under this strategy, sometimes called “export fetishism”, countries spur sales abroad, often by keeping their currencies cheap. Some save the proceeds in foreign-currency reserves, rather than spending them on imports. This strategy is one reason why the developing world’s current-account surplus exceeded $700 billion in 2008, as measured by the IMF. In the past, these surpluses were offset by American dicits. But America may now rethink the bargain. This imbalance, whereby foreigners sell their goods to America in exchange for its assets, was one potential cause of the country’s financial crisis.

　　If this global bargain does come unstuck, how should developing countries respond? In a new paper*, Dani Rodrik of Harvard University offers a novel suggestion. He argues that developing countries should continue to promote exportables, but no longer promote exports. What’s the difference? An exportable is a good that could be traded across borders, but need not be. Mr Rodrik’s recommended policies would help countries make more of these exportables, without selling quite so many abroad.

　　Countries grow by shifting labour and investment from traditional activities, where productivity is stagnant, to new industries, which abound in economies of scale or opportunities to assimilate better techniques. These new industries usually make exportable goods, such as cotton textiles or toys. But whatever the fetishists believe, there is nothing special about the act of exporting per se, Mr Rodrik argues. For example, companies do not need to venture abroad to feel the bracing sting of international competition. If their products can be traded across borders, then foreign rivals can compete with them at home.

　　As countries industrialise and diversify, their exports grow, which sometimes results in a trade surplus. These three things tend to go together. But in a statistical “horse race” between the three—industrialisation, exports and exports minus imports—Mr Rodrik finds that it is the growth of tradable, industrial goods, as a share of GDP, that does most of the work.

　　How do you promote exportables without promoting exports? Cheap currencies will not do the trick. They serve as a subsidy to exports, but also act like a tax on imports. They encourage the production of tradable goods, but discourage their consumption—which is why producers look for buyers abroad.

　　Policymakers need a different set of tools, Mr Rodrik argues. They should set aside their exchange-rate policies in favour of industrial policy, subsidising promising new industries directly. These sops would expand the production of tradable goods above what the market would dictate. But the subsidy would not discourage their consumption. Indeed, policymakers should allow the country’s exchange rate to strengthen naturally, eliminating any trade surplus. The stronger currency would cost favoured industries some foreign customers. But these firms would still do better overall than under a policy of laissez-faire.

　　Return of the cargo cult

　　Mr Rodrik offers a solution to an awkward problem: how policymakers can restore the growth strategies of the pre-crisis era without reviving the trade imbalances that accompanied them. But is his solution as neat as it sounds? Start with the theory. Mr Rodrik claims there is nothing special about exporting. He is probably right. But his statistical test is unlikely to be the last word on the matter, given the difficulties of disentangling variables that move together. Mr Rodrik’s model also assumes a single tradable good. Under his policies, countries sell the same kind of stuff at home that they formerly sold to foreigners. In a more elaborate model, foreign and local tastes would differ. China, for example, made most of the world’s third-generation mobile phones long bore 3G telephony was available at home. Firms in poor countries can learn a lot from serving richer customers abroad.

　　What about the practice? Subsidies are notoriously prone to error and abuse. Even bore the crisis, Mr Rodrik was keen to rehabilitate industrial policy in the eyes of many economists, who doubt governments’ ability to pick winners but have every faith in their aptitude for favouring corporate friends. In these circles, a cheap currency is often seen as the least disreputable form of industrial policy, because it benits exporters in general, without favouring any particular industry or firm.

　　This ingenious economist may also be preparing for a future that is further off than you might think. American policymakers are certainly worried about their country’s trade dicit. But they are far more concerned about unemployment. Most of their forts to revive demand will tend to widen the trade gap, at least in the short run. The American government is also more anxious than ever to sell its paper, and whatever they say in public, the central banks of China and other big emerging economies still seem happy to buy. Export fetishism seems fated to endure.

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